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Introduction 
In the investigation of criminal offending, through search, arrest, detention, questioning, forensic 
sampling and so on, important rights of suspects, and others, are sometimes transgressed by 
police. Such transgressions, by agents of the state, may occur in differing contexts, may be 
deliberate, reckless or accidental, and may affect relevant rights to varying extents. While every 
effort should be made to avoid the breach of rights in the first instance, the ideal of a clean slate 
in this regard is simply unobtainable. Accordingly, a criminal justice system requires a defined 
approach to police breaches of rights during an investigation and, more specifically, a criminal 
process requires a clear policy in relation to the admissibility at subsequent trial of any evidence 
obtained in breach of a suspect’s rights.  
 
In the mid-1990s, Judge Harold J. Rothwax, acting New York State Supreme Court justice, 
expressed the view that the exclusionary rule applicable in the United States was the strictest in 
existence in the democratic world: “We [the United States] are the only country in the world, 
certainly the only democracy in the world, that has a mandatory exclusionary rule.”1 However, 
the learned judge was incorrect in that regard. The exclusionary rule in operation in Ireland in 
relation to unconstitutionally obtained evidence, certainly from 1990 onwards, was in fact much 
stricter than the U.S. rule. The latter operated, and continues to operate, only in the context of 
deterrence, i.e. where the exclusion of the impugned evidence would highlight the transgression 
of rights to police and prosecutors and result in such rights being properly observed in the 
future.
2
 By contrast, the Irish rule, originally set out in the 1965 case of People (AG) v O’Brien3 
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Although it has been argued that there are a number of rationales for the exclusionary rule adopted and applied in 
but refined and clarified in People (DPP) v Kenny (1990),
4
 was expressly centred on a rationale 
of protectionism such that evidence obtained in breach of constitutional rights had to be 
automatically excluded in almost all circumstances. As the U.S. rule is based solely on 
deterrence, evidence is only excluded where police knowingly breach suspects’ rights. To 
exclude where rights were unknowingly or inadvertently breached would have no deterrent 
value. Indeed, relatively recent U.S. case-law seems to suggest that even where rights are 
knowingly breached a high degree of deterrent value may be required before exclusion will be 
justified as a remedy.
5
 A protectionist rationale was expressly preferred by the Irish Supreme 
Court in Kenny over what was viewed as the weaker protections of a deterrence rationale. 
Accordingly, under the Irish rule, evidence was excluded not only on the basis of knowing garda 
(police)
6
 breaches of constitutional rights, but also where such breaches were accidental or 
unintentional (unless there were “extraordinary excusing circumstances” in existence justifying 
admission).  
 
In April of this year, however, the Irish Supreme Court in DPP v JC
7
 expressly overruled Kenny, 
declaring it to have been erroneously decided, and established a new exclusionary rule in its 
place. This was a 4-3 majority decision of the Court (Denham CJ, Clarke, O’Donnell and 
MacMenamin JJ in the majority; Hardiman, Murray and McKechnie J dissenting), which 
Hardiman J (dissenting) described as a “revolution in principle” and “an alteration of [a] 
fundamental decision which is based on [the] exegesis of the Constitution itself.”8 Before 
looking at the judgment in JC in detail, some background on the Kenny rule is provided below.  
 
The Kenny Rule 
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A two-tiered approach to improperly obtained evidence was established by the Irish Supreme 
Court in People (AG) v O’Brien9: a discretionary approach was adopted in relation to evidence 
obtained in breach of legal rights only, with a stricter rule operating where there was a 
“deliberate and conscious” breach of constitutional rights. Evidence obtained unconstitutionally 
became automatically inadmissible. The only circumstance in which such evidence might be 
admitted was where there were so-called “extraordinary excusing circumstances”, such as the 
need to rescue a victim in peril or to prevent the imminent destruction of vital evidence. 
 
“Deliberate and Conscious” Breach of Rights 
The courts grappled with the concept of “deliberate and conscious” breach in a number of cases 
subsequent to O’Brien,10 attempting to determine whether or not this phraseology required that 
gardaí should have knowingly breached rights in order for evidence to be excluded. Ultimately, 
the matter was clarified in Kenny: because the dominant rationale for the exclusion of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence in Ireland was the protection of a suspect’s constitutional 
rights there was no requirement of mala fides on the part of the gardaí in obtaining the impugned 
evidence in order for it to be excluded at trial. The phrase “deliberate and conscious”, then, 
related to the actions of the gardaí rather than their knowledge of the breach. For example, as in 
Kenny itself, the impugned evidence had to be excluded where gardaí purposefully entered a 
dwelling to execute a search warrant, not realising that the warrant had not been properly issued. 
The majority of the Supreme Court rejected a rationale of deterrence which would necessitate 
exclusion only where the gardaí knowingly breached constitutional rights. The exclusionary rule 
was restated by Finlay C.J. in Kenny in the following terms, omitting the confusing terminology 
of “deliberate and conscious” breach: 
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“… [E]vidence obtained by invasion of the constitutional personal rights of a citizen must 
be excluded unless a court is satisfied that either the act constituting the breach of 
constitutional rights was committed unintentionally or accidentally, or is satisfied that 
there are extraordinary excusing circumstances which justify the admission of the 
evidence in [the court’s] discretion.”11 
 
Finlay CJ acknowledged that the adoption of this high protectionist stance could create problems 
in criminal trials given its propensity to exclude evidence of immense probative value. However, 
he was of the opinion that: 
 
“[T]he detection of crime and the conviction of guilty persons, no matter how important 
they may be to the ordering of society, cannot … outweigh the unambiguously expressed 
constitutional obligation ‘as far as practicable to defend and vindicate the personal rights 
of the citizen’.”12 
 
Resultantly, for the past twenty-five years, evidence has been excluded at trial in Ireland where it 
has been obtained in breach of the constitutional rights of the accused, and the actions of the 




How strict is strict? 
The majority of the Supreme Court in JC seemed eager to present the Kenny rule as an absolute 
rule of exclusion which has been operating in an overly strict manner. O’Donnell J., for example, 
stated that “one of the troubling features of Kenny is that it adopts a rule on its face qualified, but 
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in reality absolute or near absolute, at least in the field of warrants.”14 Arguably, however, this 
does not give the full picture. 
 
The facts of the O’Brien and Kenny cases were rather different and, although the Kenny 
judgment is viewed as at least a clarification of and at most an overruling of O’Brien,15 a 
dichotomy in the types of cases subject to the exclusionary rule can be traced back to this factual 
distinction. In O’Brien, gardaí executed a search warrant at 118 Captain’s Road but were 
unaware that the address innocently but erroneously listed on the face of the warrant was 118 
Cashel Road. While establishing the parameters of the Irish exclusionary rule, the Supreme 
Court in O’Brien in fact held on the facts that the evidence could be admitted in circumstances 
such as this, which the Court designated a “mere illegality”. In Kenny, there was no apparent 
defect on the face of the search warrant, rather it was found to be invalid because it had been 
issued by a Peace Commissioner without any evidence that he himself was satisfied, as required 
by statute, that there were reasonable grounds for the suspicion held by garda who swore 
information before him. Accordingly the search warrant had been issued without lawful authority 
and the evidence obtained had to be excluded.  
 
In the 1998 case of People (D.P.P.) v Balfe,
16
 Murphy J. suggested that there were two different 
rules formulated in O’Brien and Kenny respectively to deal with two different scenarios: the 
O’Brien formula being relevant where a mistake in the recording of the order of a District Court 
judge or Peace Commissioner issuing a search warrant is made and is apparent on the face of the 
warrant; and the Kenny formula applying where a search warrant is made without lawful 
authority.
17
 As the facts in Balfe related to defects on the face of the warrant, they were held to 
fall under the O’Brien rule, were deemed to be mere illegalities, and ultimately it was held that 
the trial judge had correctly exercised his discretion to admit the relevant evidence.  
 
This dichotomy of approach to the factual scenarios which have given rise to claims for 
exclusion due to breach of constitutional rights in Ireland, while arguably artificial, has provided 
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the courts with something of an escape valve and has mitigated the hard edges of the strict rule to 
a notable extent.
18
 However, surprisingly, this was not given any real acknowledgement or 
subjected to any analysis by the Court in JC. It might be argued that there is a danger in 
providing courts with an “out” such as this, as it could give rise to contrived reasoning and the 
drawing of questionable parameters in order to avoid the application of the strict rule. It is 
perhaps more intellectually honest to operate a less strict rule through the application of clear 
principles. In New Zealand where the prima facie rule of exclusion in relation to breaches of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
19
 operated in a comparatively strict manner to Ireland’s 
Kenny rule (prior to the case of R v Shaheed
20
 and the introduction of s 30 of the Evidence Act 
2006), there was some evidence of distortion of rights at the “front-end” so as to avoid the “back-
end” remedy of exclusion.21 However, such distortion of the definitional parameters of 
constitutional rights has not been a feature of the jurisprudence under Kenny in Ireland. 
 
Along with the Balfe dichotomy, a further escape valve existed within the Kenny rule itself 
whereby the presence of “extraordinary excusing circumstances” might justify the admission of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Little if any use has been made of this proviso by the 
courts,
22
 but the judicial reluctance to avail of it does not seem like a compelling reason to deem 
Kenny to have been erroneously decided and to effectively throw it out. 
 
McKechnie J, dissenting in JC, pointed to an evidential gap in terms of statistical information 
showing that the Kenny rule has led to significant frustration of prosecutions in the twenty-five 
years of its operation. While O’Donnell J (in the majority) listed examples of cases where the 
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Kenny rule had applied,
23
 McKechnie J suggested that in each of those cases the outcome was 
either favourable to the prosecution or unknown, such that they did not illustrate a significant 
difficulty with the rule to the level necessary to involve the Supreme Court in overruling its own 
previous decision,
24




Criticism of the Kenny Rule and Opportunities for Review 
The Kenny rule was never universally popular. Indeed, strong dissents were issued by two of the 
Supreme Court bench in the case itself: Griffin and Lynch JJ. favoured a deterrence-based 
approach centred on proof of blameworthiness, culpability or unfairness in terms of the 
evidence-gathering procedures
26
 and preferred to interpret “deliberate and conscious breach” as 
applying to the intentions of the gardaí rather than their actions.  
 
More recently, the majority of the Balance in the Criminal Law Review Group, an ad hoc 
committee established by the Minister for Justice in 2006 to examine a number of issues within 
criminal procedure, advocated a change to the Kenny rule. They argued that a trial judge should 
have discretion to admit unconstitutionally obtained evidence, having regard to the totality of the 
circumstances in a given case, with particular regard to the rights of the victim.
27
 The Chairman 
of the Committee, Dr Gerard Hogan SC (now a judge of the Irish Court of Appeal), added a note 
of dissent from the majority view on this issue wherein he stated: 
 
“Our society has committed itself to abiding by the rule of law and to respect and 
vindicate the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. It behoves us to take 
these rights and freedoms seriously and if the occasional exclusion of otherwise relevant 
evidence is the price of respecting these constitutional rights, then that is a price society 
should be prepared to pay in the interests of upholding the values solemnly enshrined in 
our highest law...”28 
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A potential opportunity for Supreme Court review of the Kenny rule arose in DPP (Walsh) v 
Cash, which was before the High Court in 2007 and the Supreme Court in 2010.
29
 Defence 
counsel in Cash sought to have a set of fingerprints taken from the appellant following his arrest 
on a burglary charge excluded from evidence at trial. He had been arrested on the basis of a 
match between fingerprints taken from the scene and prints that had been taken from him in 
relation to another matter some years previously which were held on file. The prosecution had 
been unable to state clearly the legal position of the retained prints, specifically, whether or not 
they ought to have been destroyed following the passage of time and the fact that no proceedings 
had been instituted in relation to the earlier matter. 
 
Although Charleton J., in the High Court, had deemed the Kenny rule to be inapplicable on the 
facts, he took some time in his judgment to outline his grievances with the rule, stating that “[a] 
rule which remorselessly excludes evidence obtained through an illegality occurring by a mistake 
does not commend itself to the proper ordering of society which is the purpose of the criminal 
law.”30 
 
The majority of the Supreme Court also deemed the Kenny rule inapplicable in Cash, preferring 
to base its decision in that case on the law of arrest. In submissions before the Supreme Court in 
JC the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) appeared disappointed that the Court had not taken 
the opportunity presented by Cash to review the Kenny rule.
31
 It seems that an appropriate case 
to allow for such review was being actively sought. Five years after Cash the DPP brought JC to 
the Supreme Court. 
 
DPP v JC 
Facts and Jurisdiction 
Before outlining the new exclusionary rule set out in JC, the manner in which this case came 
before the Supreme Court cannot be ignored. JC was suspected of involvement in three 
robberies. His dwelling was searched in May 2011 under the authority of a search warrant issued 
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pursuant to s 29 of the Offences Against the State Act 1939. He was thereafter arrested, detained 
and questioned by gardaí and made a number of inculpatory statements. Section 29 was declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the case of Damache v DPP
32
 in February 2012, 
several months prior to JC’s trial before the Circuit Criminal Court in Waterford. As s 29 
warrants were now viewed as unconstitutional, the Circuit Court judge effectively found that 
there had been no lawful authority in the warrant to allow the gardaí to enter JC’s dwelling and 
thereafter effect an arrest. Accordingly, and because there was no evidence to support any claim 
that the gardaí had entered the dwelling on foot of any other legal power, the accused was in 
unlawful custody at the time when he made the inculpatory statements, which were therefore 
inadmissible. Under the Kenny rule, this was absolutely the correct outcome of the circumstances 
which arose before the Circuit Criminal Court. 
 
However, the DPP appealed to the Supreme Court under s 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
2010. This provision, in pertinent part, allows for “with prejudice” prosecutorial appeals against 
acquittal on a question of law to the Supreme Court where a trial court has “erroneously 
excluded compelling evidence”.33 While it was accepted by all members of the Supreme Court 
that the trial judge had correctly applied the Kenny rule, the majority accepted jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal under s 23 by contending that Kenny had been erroneously decided and accordingly 
exclusion of the evidence at JC’s trial, while precedent-compliant, was erroneous. 
 
This is a most unsatisfactory approach to the interpretation of s 23. It required significant 
linguistic acrobatics by the Supreme Court and it opened up the possibility that the respondent 
might be retried on the basis of the new exclusionary rule which was about to be set out by the 
Court, despite the fact that the trial judge had correctly applied the law as it had stood for almost 
a quarter of a century. As noted by McKechnie J (dissenting), even if no retrial was ordered, the 
finding of the Supreme Court in this case that there was compelling evidence which was wrongly 
excluded could lead to an ongoing query of guilt over the respondent, despite his acquittal. 
McKechnie J declared the use of s 23 in this case a “… frontal attack on the acquittal” which 
                                                 
32
 [2012] IESC 11. See Daly, Y.M. “Independent Issuing of Search Warrants: DPP v Damache” (2013) 17(1) E&P 
114. 
33
 Criminal Procedure Act 2010, s 23(3)(a).  
would leave “…a public blur on the character of the respondent who has no legal means of 
correcting that life lasting stigma.”34 
 
The distortion of language and threat to the rule of law necessitated by the use of s 23 proved 
superfluous in this particular case in the end as the Court unanimously refused to order a retrial 
of JC “in the interests of justice”.35 The same outcome could have been achieved under s 34 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 1967 (as inserted by s 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006) which 
allows for a “without prejudice” appeal following acquittal and does not require the Court to find 
that the trial judge fell into error in excluding evidence. The willingness of the majority of the 
Supreme Court to accept jurisdiction through a contortion of the language of s 23 is 
disappointing, if not disingenuous. Arguably the decision of the DPP to pursue this case under s 
23 rather than s 34 is even more questionable. 
 
The new exclusionary rule 
The fundamental and express decision of the majority of the Irish Supreme Court in DPP v JC 
was that the Kenny case was erroneously decided and that the exclusionary rule as set out therein 
is no longer to be applied. There is some indication in the majority judgments that modern 
developments in terms of garda accountability and suspect rights might have led to the view that 
the Kenny rule is no longer appropriate,
36
 although the actual decision is to the effect that it was 
erroneously decided from the start. The newly-stated rule, while there is more to it than this (as 
discussed below), allows for evidence obtained in inadvertent breach of constitutional rights to 
be admitted at trial while evidence obtained in knowing, reckless or grossly negligent breach 
must be excluded, except in exceptional circumstances.  
 
Six separate judgments were issued by the Supreme Court (the Chief Justice did not issue a 
judgment of her own, but concurred with the majority), amounting to over 155,000 words. The 
majority acknowledged the difficult balance to be achieved by the need to ensure that all 
potentially relevant evidence is considered at a criminal trial and the need to ensure that 
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investigative and enforcement agencies (including the Garda Síochána) operate properly within 
the law.
37
 O’Donnell J. noted the societal cost which can come from the exclusion of probative 
evidence:  
 
“the exclusion of evidence of undoubted cogency extracts a significant price in terms of 
the capacity of the court to perform its primary function [to determine contested matters 
to a requisite standard of proof], and accordingly in terms of confidence in, and respect 
for, the legal system.  Such a course must always be justified by considerations sufficient 
to pay that price.”38 
 
The majority held that Kenny had been erroneously decided. O’Donnell J., for example, declared 
himself satisfied that “the decision in Kenny is wrong by any standard.”39  
 
Strong dissents were issued by Hardiman, Murray and McKechnie JJ. Rejecting the contention 
that Kenny was erroneously decided, McKechnie J stated: 
 
“Whether one favours or dislikes the result in Kenny, it cannot be doubted but that all 
issues and matters of relevance were considered, that such issues were fully debated, that 
means of engaging with both interests were looked at and that reasons were given for the 
court’s ultimate conclusion.  Moreover, by openly acknowledging that disadvantages or 
anomalies might result from the approach taken, the court must be credited with having 
been ever so mindful of the consequences which might flow from its decision.”40 
 
In the view of Hardiman J. the judgment in Kenny is “one of the monuments of the constitutional 
jurisprudence of independent Ireland”41 and he contended that the outcome sought, and achieved, 
by the DPP in JC was “quite inconsistent with the gradualist, minimalist and ‘interstitial’ power 
of the Common Law judges to develop or evolve the law in light of changing circumstances.”42 
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As to any question of changes in the past twenty-five years which might make it desirable to 
abandon the Kenny rule, Hardiman J., referencing the Morris Tribunal,
43
 amongst other matters, 
stated that, to the contrary “there have, during that time, been a considerable number of deeply 
disturbing developments both in relation to the Garda Síochána itself and to the arrangements for 
its oversight.”44 
 
The internal consistency of the three majority judgments issued is likely to require some 
attention in future cases. While a clear decision was made to state the new rule only once - in the 
judgment of Clarke J. - the existence of a number of majority judgments may still create some 
confusion. For example, O’Donnell J specified that the decision in JC applies only in the context 
of search warrants, while Clarke J was not quite as restrictive. He suggested that the new rule 
applies only where there is a question about the manner in which a relevant piece of evidence 
was gathered, as opposed to any question relating to the probative value of the evidence given 
the way in which it was obtained. Accordingly, the decision does not relate to cases where, for 
example, a confession is alleged to have been obtained through oppression or threats. But what if 
the admissibility of inculpatory statements was in issue due to a garda breach of a suspect’s right 
to legal advice, for example? Would that now be ruled by JC? It seems that it would have to be, 
given the express overruling of Kenny, though the judgment of O’Donnell J. is arguably more 
restrictive than that. 
 
In any event, the rule as now constructed is set out clearly in the judgment of Clarke J,
45
 and he 
helpfully provides clear reasons for the inclusion of each individual aspect of this rule. The main 
elements are as follows: 
 The onus is on the prosecution to establish the admissibility of all evidence.   
 If a claim is raised that evidence was obtained in breach of constitutional rights, the onus 
is on the prosecution to establish either (i) that there was no unconstitutionality, or (ii) 
that despite any interference with constitutional rights the evidence should still be 
admitted. 
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 Where evidence is obtained in deliberate and conscious violation of constitutional rights 
(in the sense of knowing breach of rights) it should be excluded, except in exceptional 
circumstances. 
 Whether or not a breach of constitutional rights was deliberate and conscious requires 
analysis of the conduct or state of mind of the individual who actually gathered the 
evidence, as well as any senior official or officials within the investigating or 
enforcement authority concerned who was involved either in that decision or in decisions 
of that type generally or in putting in place policies concerning evidence-gathering of the 
type concerned. 
 Where evidence was taken in breach of constitutional rights, but this was not deliberate 
and conscious, there is a presumption in favour of exclusion, which can be rebutted by 
evidence that the breach of rights was either (i) inadvertent or (ii) derived from 
subsequent legal developments. 
 
Basically, while the Kenny rule operated on a rationale of protectionism, the JC rule operates on 
a rationale of deterrence: evidence will not be excluded if it was obtained in inadvertent breach 
of constitutional rights. Hardiman J (dissenting) profoundly objected to the “finding that 
‘inadvertence’ by public officials with coercive powers will sufficiently excuse a breach of a 
citizen’s constitutional rights to allow material obtained by such breach to be proved in evidence 
against that citizen.”46 He stated that he regarded this “as a gratuitous writing down of the respect 
due to the Constitution, which is an absolutely retrograde step which I deeply deplore.”47 
 
“Deliberate and Conscious” Breach of Rights (again) 
The shift from protectionism to deterrence in JC was partly achieved through the determination 
that the term “deliberate and conscious” relates to the state of mind of the person obtaining the 
evidence (and/or any relevant senior officials) rather than his/her actions. One might have 
thought that in boldly overruling the Kenny case, as the majority of the Supreme Court has 
expressly done in JC, it would have been better to avoid this particular turn of phrase altogether, 
as its meaning has been so contentious over the years since O’Brien and on through Kenny. 
                                                 
46
 Ibid. per Hardiman J. 
47
 Ibid. 
Indeed, the “deliberate and conscious” formulation is not fully accurate in terms of the test 
emanating from the Court in JC as Clarke J clarifies that the concept of “inadvertence” for the 
purposes of the rule does not include recklessness or gross negligence.
48
 O’Donnell J concurs 
with this view.
49
 Accordingly, evidence obtained in knowing, reckless or grossly negligent 
breach of constitutional rights will be excluded, except in exceptional circumstances. So, 
“deliberate and conscious” breach of rights also includes reckless and grossly negligent breach of 
rights, which the everyday meaning of “deliberate and conscious” might not readily impart. 
 
What will be the impact of a “deliberate and conscious” breach of rights, within the meaning of 
the JC rule? It seems that a garda who knows he holds an invalid search warrant will obtain 
evidence that will later be excluded; a garda who is subjectively reckless, in the sense that he 
knows there is a risk that the warrant he holds may be invalid, will obtain evidence that will later 
be excluded; and, a garda who takes an objectively unreasonable risk that the warrant he holds 
may be invalid which falls so far below the standard of care that he ought to take in executing a 
warrant that it amounts to gross negligence, will also obtain evidence that will later be excluded. 
Only a garda who has no idea that the warrant he holds may be invalid will obtain evidence that 
can be admitted.  
 
The exact operation of the new rule in practice obviously remains to be seen in individual, 
subsequent cases. But, it seems possible that the outcome could be something of a reversal of the 
dichotomy which has come about since Balfe: O’Brien allowing for admission of the evidence 
where there is an error on the face of the warrant and Kenny leading to exclusion where there is a 
deficiency in the authorisation of the warrant or its legal value. If evidence is to be excluded now 
in circumstances involving gross negligence on the part of the gardaí, the O’Brien scenario could 
attract more serious consequences under JC. In O’Brien-type cases, the difficulty in the warrant 
is usually visible on its face – an incorrect address, for example, as in O’Brien itself, or in the 
more recent case of DPP v Mallon.
50
 In such cases, will the newly-expressed rule now require 
that gardaí check their warrants for the correct information before executing them? Surely a 
failure to do so could, and should, be viewed as reckless, or at least grossly negligent. Will these 
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errors, previously viewed as mere typographical errors, now take on a greater significance? This 
remains to be seen and is certainly arguable, though it is unlikely to have been the intent of the 
majority in JC. 
 
Unconstitutionality derived from subsequent legal developments 
A further notable aspect of the newly-stated rule is the notion that evidence ought to be admitted 
where its unconstitutionality arises as a result of a subsequent legal development. This matter is 
directly related to the facts of JC itself, given the impact of the finding of unconstitutionality in 
the Damache case between the execution of the warrant at JC’s dwelling and his trial. 
 
Under Kenny, the statements obtained in JC were correctly excluded. However, under the new 
JC rule, such statements would be admissible as although s 29 warrants are now invalid and 
could not be used to gain entry to a dwelling from the date of the Damache decision onwards, 
they were valid at the time of execution at JC’s dwelling. This gives rise to some concern.  
 
The constitutional difficulty with s 29 was that it allowed for warrants to be authorised by senior 
gardaí who were involved in the investigation for which the warrant was deemed necessary. 
This, as the Supreme Court found in Damache, provided no independent oversight of garda 
conduct and inadequate protection for the rights of citizens. Section 29, accordingly, was struck 
down for good reason: independence and impartiality are essential to the integrity of the criminal 
process, and were not provided for by the s 29 procedure. The notion that because it was viewed 
as good law at the time of the execution of a specific warrant – largely because no case had yet 
made it to the Supreme Court to test its constitutionality – evidence obtained thereunder should 
be admitted at a trial arising after it has been declared to be bad law, undermines the declaration 
of unconstitutionality. Perhaps more significantly this approach also draws the relevant trial 
court into acting upon evidence obtained in breach of the Constitution. Although the gardaí in the 
relevant circumstances were unaware of the unconstitutionality, as it had yet to be declared, a 
later trial court admitting and acting upon the evidence obtained does so knowing that such 
evidence was obtained in what are now viewed as unconstitutional circumstances. Surely this 
would bring the administration of justice into greater disrepute than any alleged frustration of a 
prosecution by the Kenny rule. The fact that Ireland is a small jurisdiction which generates a 
correspondingly limited pool of litigation makes this concern all the more profound; as Damache 
demonstrated, some time may elapse before a challenge to the constitutionality of a practice is 
raised before the courts. The approach advocated in JC would allow for evidence obtained under 




There are many more facets to the judgments in DPP v JC which will require attention in the 
fullness of time. The nuances of operating the new rule will only become apparent as cases come 
through the trial and appellate courts. What might be noted in conclusion at this juncture, 
however, is that the Kenny rule was one of the few remaining true “due process” aspects of Irish 
criminal procedure. While the Supreme Court recently enhanced the constitutional right to legal 
advice, by acknowledging that this right includes a prohibition on questioning a detained suspect 
prior to the arrival of his/her requested solicitor,
51
 in recent years there has been much 
curtailment of suspect rights within the criminal process, both in the pre-trial investigative stage 
and at trial. Since the decision in Kenny, for example, we have seen extended detention periods,
52
 
extremely broad intrusions on the right to silence,
53
 the curtailment of the right to bail,
54
 an 
increase in reliance on opinion evidence from gardaí at trial,
55
 alterations to the rule against 
hearsay in relation to witness statements
56
 and so on. The existence of the strict exclusionary rule 
from Kenny may have been thought of as a last refuge of “due process” in a swell of “crime 
control” rights-limiting enactments.57 But it is definitively no more as a result of DPP v JC. 
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